Weber says this vocation is a rationalized version of the Protestant conception of calling or vocation (Beruf), tragically disenchanting the world and leaving the idea of calling as a worthless remains (caput mortuum). In it, Weber argues that the vocation of a scientist is to produce specialized, rationalized knowledge that will be superseded. On the centenary of Max Weber’s “Science as a Vocation,” his essay still performs interpretative work. These findings suggest that bellicose metaphors for cancer can influence the health beliefs of nonpatients in ways that may make them less willing to enact healthy behaviors. Finally, even though battles invoke vigilance and action, Study 4 failed to find that such metaphors motivate people to immediately see their doctor when imagining a cancer scare. Consistent with this implication, battle metaphors increase fatalistic beliefs about cancer prevention (e.g., believing that there is little one can do to prevent getting cancer study 3). One way to approach a battle is to surrender and give up control. Indeed, reading about a person’s “battle” or “fight” against cancer makes cancer treatment seem more difficult (studies 1-4). Battles and war are usually seen as being difficult. The current research investigates how this affects inferences about cancer treatment, prevention, and monitoring. But are they good metaphors for health communicators to use? Because metaphors can guide reasoning about abstract concepts, framing cancer with metaphors of battle, war, and enemies leads people to apply attributes of these concepts to cancer. 68-77īellicose metaphors for cancer are ubiquitous.

In “Phenomenology and Mind”, 18, 2020, pp. Finally, it will clarify why phenomenology and in particular hermeneutical-phenomenology can illuminate the understanding of the psychiatric object and its implications in a cultural context, in order to achieve a more humanistic psychiatry. In doing so, the paper will firstly examine the “psychiatric object” and its language secondly, it will show the difference between taxonomyĪnd ontology, both of interest for the psychiatric object third, it will insist on the critique of the epistemological status of psychiatry conceived from a natural point of view following three main paths:Ī metaphysical one (Heidegger, Jaspers), a social one (Szasz, Foucault, Basaglia), and an ethical one (Laing). The problem of names of illnesses is both a problem of words and values that should address not only the classification of disorders, but also a fundamental question both for medical sciences and humanities: can psychiatric nosology and classifications fit with the ontological constitution of human beings? This paper aims to discuss the so-called “psychiatric object” and its language and it intends to provide a hermeneutical-phenomenological account to mental health. Since language shapes the way in which we think, live and act, it is important to choose words that encourage people to act responsibly, to cooperate and to overcome the hardships of the COVID19 pandemic together. While war narratives instil fear, it seems to me that new forms of solidarity and new models of coexistence are required. Starting from a philosophical account of the relationship between language, fear and anguish, I aim to show how this narrative is unhelpful, both for society at large and especially for patients and health care workers. Politicians declare themselves at war fighting an invisible enemy and health care workers, who are in direct contact with COVID-19 positive patients, are said to be “fighting” on the “frontlines”. This is more evident in these times of the COVID-19 pandemic, where our experiences of language and of the world seem to be characterised mainly by war terminology.

Through this contribution I aim to show how the role of language and metaphors is fundamental to our understanding of reality, affecting the way we ordinarily act and live, and particularly important in facing fears and anguish.

War with words app